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A PREFATORY NOTE
BENJAMIN KAPLAN *
I had intended to say little more by way of an introduction to
this issue of the Review than that the revised Federal Rule 23 was
receiving a tolerably good and understanding reception by the courts.
But the Supreme Court has put that estimate somewhat in doubt by its
recent decision of Snyder v. Harris (March 25, 1969). 1 So I must
reconnoiter for a paragraph or two.
The reform of Rule 23 was intended to shake the law of class
actions free of abstract categories contrived from such bloodless words
as "joint," "common," and "several," and to rebuild the law on func-
tional lines responsive to those recurrent life patterns which call for
mass litigation through representative parties. Hence the new articula-
tions of the permissible types of class actions which appear in subdivi-
sion (b) of the revised Rule. As part of the change, that old perverse
anomaly, the "spurious" class action, was jettisoned. And whereas the
old Rule had paid virtually no attention to the practical administra-
tion of class actions, the revised Rule dwelt long on this matter—not,
to be sure, by prescribing detailed procedures, but by confirming the
courts' broad powers and inviting judicial initiative. The entire recon-
struction of the Rule bespoke an intention to promote more vigorously
than before the dual missions of the class-action device: (1) to reduce
units of litigation by bringing under one umbrella what might otherwise
be many separate but duplicating actions; (2) even at the expense of
increasing litigation, to provide means of vindicating the rights of
groups of people who individually would be without effective strength
to bring their opponents into court at all.
In this view of what the revision was all about,2 the Snyder case
makes a hollow sound. Technically the case holds that where a class
action of the (b) (3) type—the most adventuresome of the new types
—happens to be grounded jurisdictionally upon diversity of citizenship,
the requisite "amount in controversy,"2 an amount in excess of $10,000,
* Royal] Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. A.B., College of the City of New
York, 1929; LL.B., Columbia, 1933. The author was reporter to the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules from its organization in 1960 to July 1, 1966, and has since then been a
member of the Committee. The views expressed here, however, are entirely personal,
1 89 S. Ct. 1053 (1969).
2 See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 Harv, L. Rev. 356, 375-400 (1967).
3 28 U.S.C. II 1332(a) (1964).
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is not to be figured by aggregating what the class as a whole is de-
manding. Rather each individual representative must himself have a
demand over $10,000. This reading resulted in dismissal of the Snyder
action. It is true that, in practice, the bulk of class actions lodged in
federal courts are based on jurisdictional statutes in which amount in
controversy plays no part.' Still the analysis employed in the Snyder
case is discouraging. The majority opinion by Justice Black, when it
pulverizes the class to examine the interest of each named plaintiff,
harks back to terminological distinctions that one would have thought
inapposite to the new Rule; indeed Justice Black seems pro tanto
to resurrect the "spurious" action. The net effect of the decision is to
disfavor the small fellow and thereby to defeat a main purpose of the
Rule revision. These and other iniquities of the majority opinion are
set out in Justice Fortas' discerning and persuasive dissent. We may
hope that the Supreme Court's aberration will be temporary.
Putting Snyder to one side, the (b) (3) grouping has presented
some nice issues, but the lower courts have prevailingly met them with
patient good will. Subdivision (b) (3) authorizes class-action treatment
when the court finds, 5 first, "that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members," and, second, "that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy." A considerable variety of situations have been tendered
to the courts under these provisions—various cases of roughly parallel
rights and duties, held or sustained by a sizable group, arising from
some congeries of facts—and we have already a body of judicial work
elucidating the criteria which is by and large far more to the point,
far more interesting, than the run of opinions under the predecessor
Rule.
The "predominating-common-question" criterion looks to im-
portant themes running pervasively through the entire litigation.
Without such themes a purported class action would, in the actual
course of its preparation and trial, fractionate into numerous separate
actions. The problem of sensing which situations are suitable in this
respect for class-action treatment can be tough but it seems manageable
especially in the light of accumulating experience. The "superior-
method" criterion reminds us that a class action is only one of a number
of procedural devices for handling multiple litigation, ranging from the
test case, through the "coordinated pretrial" of new section 1407 of
title 28, to the consolidation of actions. Why should a class action be
preferred over the other available devices in a particular situation?
4
 See the remarks of Justice Fortas, dissenting in Snyder v. Harris, 89 S. Ct. at 1060
& n.2.
5
 Other prerequisites, common to all class actions, are set out in subdivision (a) of the
Rule.
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This question needs to be put squarely and answered openly. So Judge
Weinstein argued in his academic writing,' from which the draftsmen
of the new Rule took encouragement; and he has elaborated this view
in his imaginative and important opinion in Dolgow v. Anderson.'
Litigants and judges are thus to project themselves imaginatively
into the future course of the lawsuit and try to foresee the likely
management snarls. One such tangle can arise in providing the notice
to the (b) (3) class which alerts the class members to their right to
"opt out" of the class and go it alone. Where the class is large and
dispersed, effective notice-giving can be difficult and expensive. But
the notice, according to the Rule, is to be "the best .. . practicable,"
not the best imaginable. We should not swing quixotically from the
extreme of the old Rule where no notice to the class was required in
any case, to insistence in the (b) (3) situation upon a triple-plated form
of notice which may turn out to be prohibitive.' Fair play to the class
comes about through adequacy of representation more than through
notice. In singular cases great difficulty with the notice may suggest
that no class action should be attempted; on the other hand it may
suggest upon deeper thought that the action should preferably be typed
as a (b) (1) or (b) (2) class action, the more conventional types, where
opportunity to opt out is neither needed nor afforded. Finally I refer
again to the Dolgow opinion which considers the conditions under
which the burden of the notice, including the expense, can fairly be
put upon a party opposing the class or be shared by both sides.
Another management problem lurks at the end, not the beginning
of the (b) (3) action, namely, the problem of securing final relief for
class members. After findings favorable to a plaintiff class, say in a
fraud or antitrust action, the, members would ordinarily have somehow
to prove the amounts to which they are entitled, and provision must
then be made for payment to them individually. These procedures
can have a nightmarish look when the members are very many and
their stakes very modest. On these matters we are not without analogies
and precedents,' though some may prove on examination to be ex-
amples from which one learns in reverse, so to speak. I expect the
problems will appear less formidable when they actually arise than
they do now in anticipation. Yet imagination and even daring may be
required of counsel and courts in devising abbreviated but fair pro-
cedures leading to hand-tailored relief which may well be quite novel
6 Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 Buffalo L.
Rev. 433 (1960) •
7 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
8 See Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule:
Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 889 (1968).
0 For example, the distribution to members of the class following settlement of the
Transitron action. See Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass.
1963).
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in form. To all this I should add that insofar as class actions will en-
hance the forensic opportunities of hitherto powerless groups, they will
tend to probe the tcrrae incognitae of substantive law.
There are some who are repelled by these massive, complex, un-
conventional lawsuits because they call for so much judicial initiative
and management. We hear talk that it all belongs not to the courts
but to administrative agencies. But by hypothesis we are dealing with
cases that are not handled by existing agencies, and I do not myself see
any subversion of judicial process here but rather a fine opportunity
for its accommodation to new challenges of the times. The class action
takes its place in a larger search for pliant and sensitive procedures.
I confess that I am exhilarated, not depressed, by experimentation
which spies out carefully the furthest possibilities of the new Rule. The
first three years of the Rule have already produced some innovative
opinions which engage sympathetic analysis regardless of their final
merits. It should perhaps be counted a measure of the quality of the
Rule that it provokes such opinions.
No one, I suppose, expects of a Rule that it shall solve its problems
fully and forever. Indeed, if the problems are real ones, they can never
be solved. We are merely under the duty of trying continually to solve
them.
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